that what moves matter or determines the motion of it vitally, must needs do it by some other enf rgy of its own, as it is reasonable also to conceive, that itself hath some vital sympathy with that matter, which it acts upon* But we apprehend, that both these may be without clear and express consciousness. Thus the philosopher:

Y | » / <\ « . rx f f^ En, 3.1.2.

£<t>if €V€f>ya*a? icec ^ ^av AJJ, €y«pyaa o£, c< 3^ jjjj. j.

TO irup *ycp-y€t, eXX* ?J fvlpyaa avrijc, ai<y$tf0"tc nc *Traprjj* jctvqcnc TIC ouic CIA:*/-

Every life is energy, even the worst of lives, therefore that of nature; whose energy is not like that of fire, but such an energy, as though there be no sense belonging to it, yet is it not temerarious or fortuitous, but orderly and regular.,—

Wherefore this controversy, whether the energy of the plastic nature be cogitation or no, seema to be but a logomachy, or contention about words. For if clear and express consciousness besupposed to be included in cogitation, then it must needs be granted, that cogitation doth not belong to the plastic life of nature; but if the notion of that word be enlarged, *so* as to comprehend all actiop distinct from local motion, and to be of equal extent with life, then the energy of nature is cogitation.

Nevertheless, if any one thiuk fit to attribute some obscure and imperfect sense or perception, different from that of animals, to the energy of nature, and will therefore call it a kind of drowsy, una wakened, or astonished cogitation, the philosopher before mentioned will not very much gainsay it: ESric *fiovX^rai wmaiv* f[1]^.^^[8]*

Najfura,,

* ,/ < •^ ^ *f*

conteKiplat.

«7T4 TWV oXXwy ri}v
aafl^orcv *i ri^v crvyijatv,
et
imb, p.

> " - *t* 345* s»

«t XX* (KOV £?TIC TI|V T£R»
***VWU&V* Tl| TOW**